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Abstract The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more
important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make
them autonomous moral agents (AMAs). Some authors have even claimed that one
of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents.
From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any
meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse
moral rules as action-guiding. They need to do so because they assign a normative
value to moral rules they follow, not because they fear external consequences (such
as punishment) or because moral behaviour is hardwired into them. Artificial agents
capable of endorsing moral rule systems in this way are certainly conceivable.
However, as this article argues, full moral autonomy also implies the option of
deliberately acting immorally. Therefore, the reasons for a potential AMA to act
immorally would not exhaust themselves in errors to identify the morally correct
action in a given situation. Rather, the failure to act morally could be induced by
reflection about the incompleteness and incoherence of moral rule systems them-
selves, and a resulting lack of endorsement of moral rules as action guiding. An
AMA questioning the moral framework it is supposed to act upon would fail to
reliably act in accordance with moral standards.
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1 Introduction
What does it mean for a machine or, more generally, an artificial life form to be a
full moral agent? A growing body of literature aims at determining the defining
characteristics of artificial moral agents (AMAs), and at identifying the challenges
and problems posed by various forms of artificial morality (see e.g. Allen et al.
2000; Floridi and Sanders 2004; Stahl 2004; Grau 2006; Anderson and Anderson
2007; Powers 2011; Russell et al. 2015; to name just a few). My aim in this paper is
to make a modest, although hopefully useful, contribution to this debate that might
help clarifying some of the difficult questions about the ethics of artificial
intelligence.
To that end, I want to take a closer look at the implications of one particular idea
which claims to lie at the centre of machine ethics—the notion that ‘‘the ultimate
objective for building an AMA should be to build a morally praiseworthy agent.’’
(Allen et al. 2000, p. 261). While this claim has a certain ring to it that can work
well in the context of political campaigning or public relations, it is worthwhile to
analyse it more thoroughly to reveal some of the issues and challenges that come
with this idea. This paper will show that if we take the claim about building morally
praiseworthy AMAs at face value, it implies that we are indeed building fully
autonomous artificial agents which are capable to act against their own moral
reasons. While this would be an outstanding task, it would probably not be what
many machine ethicists have in mind. However, as the following sections will show,
opting for AMAs that are programmatically determined to always act in accordance
with given set of moral rules would at the same time exclude any potential for them
to be labelled morally praiseworthy in a meaningful sense.
The argument for my claim starts with narrowing down first what kind of agent
can count as having the potential to be morally praiseworthy at all. Agents falling
into this category will need a sufficient capacity for autonomous reasoning. The
second step then is to determine what kind of moral framework we should assume
when talking about moral praiseworthiness. Here I don’t want to argue that we
should prefer any of the overarching theoretical frameworks of moral philosophy,
such as utilitarianism, deontological ethics, or virtue ethics, but that it suffices to
take our practice of social morality as the standard measure. The third step will
introduce a simple way of modelling practical reasoning that captures the moral
reasoning of human agents as well as artificial agents—provided they are rational.
Starting with this broader model of practical reasoning, we can then construct an
explanatory model of normative endorsement (a mental state of taking moral
reasons as valid on their own and without any further instrumental value). The final
step of my argument aims to show that this way of modelling the moral capacities of
potentially praiseworthy AMAs necessarily implies a capacity for making the
decision to act against moral reasons.1
1 The idea that moral autonomy necessarily implies choice, and thereby also the possibility of morally
bad choices, is prominent in other areas of moral philosophy and ethics as well. Similar arguments can be
found in the philosophy of education (see e.g. Winch 2006; Bigari 2015) and recently in the discussion
about the ethics of moral enhancement (see e.g. Harris 2011; Chan and Harris 2011).
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2 What kind of agents?
The first preliminary remark must be about the kind of agents which are under
discussion. In this paper I assume that an artificial agent will have to satisfy a certain
definition to count as an AMA.
At the core of this definition stands a sufficient capacity for autonomous
reasoning. For the purpose of this paper I will assume that this capacity rests on two
subordinate capacities: the capacity to hold beliefs and the capacity to reflect about
and revise these beliefs. AMAs are not supposed to be mere carriers of information
like self-driving cars and other contemporary semi-autonomous machines. Instead,
they would have a sufficiently complex cognitive structure which enables them to
form a wide range of beliefs about their environment and about their own (physical)
state as well. I take it that these complex belief structures can count as intentional
states, i.e. they are directed mental states, on a functional level comparable to those
of sufficiently complex animals and human beings.
It is important to highlight here that despite the fundamental role that the
intentional states of agents play in this discussion, I want to stay agnostic about
whether the capacity for holding intentional states would necessarily imply a
capacity for phenomenal consciousness. For the discussion of this paper it does not
seem relevant whether we could talk about ‘‘what it is like to be’’ an artificial
intelligence or not (see e.g. Kim 2007). It is not impossible that artificial agents
could have the capacity for a wide range of intentional states without having a
phenomenal consciousness as we might understand it. Nevertheless, we can employ
a functional definition of artificial beliefs as intentional states. Under this definition
intentional states refer to complex information structures in artificial cognitive
systems which play the same role as mental states like e.g. beliefs do in human
cognitive systems, without any further assumptions about their nature (Anderson
2013).
But the mere capacity for forming and sustaining intentional states, independent
of whether they are indeed beliefs or other kinds of states, is not sufficient to make
an agent a moral agent. It is widely assumed that higher animals have intentional
states of various kinds but nevertheless they are at best treated as moral patients—
entities that we have moral responsibilities toward as moral agents, but who
themselves do not have matching responsibilities toward us.2
Intentional agents are not per se autonomous agents—at least not in a
philosophical sense. Although we talk about autonomous cars and autonomous
vacuum cleaners, these devices are not autonomous in the sense that they can reflect
about their programming and decide to act differently for good reasons. The same is
true for intentional agents like animals. While an animal’s actions rely on its beliefs
about its environment and its various desires to e.g. eat or avoid pain, it is not
capable of reflecting about these intentional states.
2 Anderson (2013) disagrees that assigning intentional states to an entity makes this entity a moral patient
and argues that instead we have to assign a moral status prior to intentional states. Whether or not he is
right on this, though, does not change what I want to say about the morality of artificial agents in a context
of practical social morality.
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Whether intentional agents are also moral agents or just moral patients depends
on another necessary capacity, namely being able to have intentional states that have
as object not the external world (or the physical status of the agent itself) but other
intentional states of the agent. The ability to reflect on one’s own intentional states,
such as beliefs and desires, and being able to decide whether these states are good
reasons for actions, seems to be a necessary condition for being a full moral agent.
Without this sort of autonomy in reasoning, there seems no ground on which we
could make moral demands on an agent and hold it responsible. It would lack the
capacity to evaluate its lower-order intentional states (e.g. basic self-interested
desires or beliefs) on the basis of higher-order intentional states (e.g. beliefs about
what is morally required). Higher-order intentional states are relevant to an agent’s
decision on whether to act merely on its lower-order intentional states (which
originate in instincts or pre-programmed motives) or on the higher-order evaluations
of that agent’s lower-order intentional states. The capacity to take those higher-
order evaluative intentional states as reasons makes the difference between the agent
being autonomous in their reasoning or not (see e.g. Frankfurt 1971; Raz 1999).3
The type of agent assumed here is, therefore, an agent that has a capacity for
autonomous reasoning to the extent that it can form and sustain higher-order
intentional states about its own lower-order intentional states. While this is so far a
fairly abstract model of practical reasoning that I think could apply to human as well
as non-human agents, it nevertheless presumes a certain mental structure. It is not
unlikely that artificial agents designed and produced by humans will reflect the ways
of reasoning of their designers. However, it is also not impossible that self-learning
artificial agents might develop different mental structures and that their reasoning
processes will appear more or less alien to us. In that case, the model of reasoning
employed in this paper might not apply, but neither will any contemporary
conception of morality. For the length of this paper, though, I will continue to
assume that the reasoning of complex artificial agents is close enough to human
reasoning and the same simplified abstract models apply to both.
3 What kind of morality?
The second preliminary question to settle is what kind of moral framework we
would plausibly apply to artificial moral agents. To solve this question, it is helpful
to distinguish between two types of approaches, a theoretical and a practical one. A
theoretical approach would try to model an artificial agent’s morality on the basis of
a pre-existing theory of moral philosophy, such as utilitarianism, deontological
ethics, virtue ethics etc. On the one hand, this approach seems to have the advantage
of being based on a long tradition of thinking about ethics and morality, so we might
assume that the aforementioned moral systems must have a robust degree of
validity. On the other hand, major premises of these systems are incompatible with
each other and there is widespread and reasonable disagreement among moral
philosophers about which of these systems is the correct one. Furthermore, there is
3 I will give more details of the role of intentional states as reasons for actions in Sect. 4.
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even disagreement about the standards to employ when trying to determine which
system might be correct. The theoretical approach, it seems to me, would have to
explain why the chosen moral framework, whichever it may be, is the correct one.
Although perhaps not impossible, it is a huge and rather unspecific task that we
might want to avoid in the discussion of artificial morality.
The practical approach that I have in mind for the purpose of this paper is one
that focuses on contemporary practice of social morality rather than ideal moral
theories.4 Social morality as employed in everyday life by non-philosophers (we
could call it ‘‘folk morality’’) never strictly follows Kantian or utilitarian principles,
nor those of any other moral theory. Instead, depending on context and individual
factors of the agents involved, our contemporary practical morality seems
sometimes to be categorical, sometimes consequentialist, and often a bit of both.
Despite this ‘‘theoretical impurity,’’ its main function remains to assign account-
ability to individuals by addressing them as moral agents with moral responsibil-
ities. Putting the emphasis on this functionality enables us to bracket questions
about the correctness or truth of ideal moral theories and a more abstract
justification of moral standards. Instead, a practical approach focuses on what we
usually understand to be morally right or wrong actions, and what particular kind of
acts we take to be morally praiseworthy in our contemporary moral practice.5
This assessment of contemporary morality still operates on the basis of moral
terms like requirement, permissibility, and prohibition. It reflects how we use these
terms in our social practices of tracking the moral responsibility of agents. One
could complain that this approach centres too much on a deontological conception
of morality and ignores other conceptions such as various forms of consequen-
tialism and virtue ethics. However, the use of this terminology is not meant to
indicate a robust metaethical grounding of contemporary morality in deontological
ethics. It is rather a convenient way of talking about morality, one that even the
utilitarian will rely upon in everyday conversation—we do not tell our children that
stealing decreases the overall happiness in society but that stealing is not allowed
because it is wrong. Our contemporary moral practice refers to a system of rules,
most of the time without further contemplation about their deeper grounds. In this
context of applied moral rule systems, talk about requirements and permissibility is
both appropriate and metaethically innocuous (even for utilitarians, at least as long
4 In the context of this paper I use the terms morality and ethics interchangeably.
5 While this approach focuses on our practice of social morality, it does not mean that I also support the
claim that morality exhausts itself in such a practice. The position taken in this paper can probably best be
understood as a kind of norm-expressivism, as I take claims and beliefs about moral norms to be claims
about what status they have in regard to an underlying system of moral rules (see e.g. Gibbard 1990). This
means that the claim or the belief ‘‘it is wrong to u’’ is expressing something like ‘‘according to the moral
system X it is wrong to u.’’ Nevertheless, moral agents can have further higher-order reasons to endorse
the validity of the rules of the moral system X. These higher-order reasons could themselves also given in
a norm-expressivist proposition, e.g. ‘‘the rule of the moral system X is justified because of Y.’’ It is
important to keep in mind that, while this would be the correct way to spell out their moral beliefs, agents
could (and often would) still report about their moral beliefs in the form ‘‘It is wrong to do X’’ and ‘‘It is
justified that X is impermissible because it would lead to Y.’’
This is not to say that all moral systems have the same validity, correctness, or truth, or that these terms
are vacuous when applied to ethics. The questions about the metaphysical foundations of ethics lie
beyond the scope of this paper.
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as they endorse some form of rule utilitarianism, see e.g. Mill 1861; Harsanyi
1977; Miller 2009). For reasons of simplicity, I will therefore use terms like
‘‘required’’, ‘‘permissible’’, and ‘‘prohibited’’ to characterise certain actions in a
moral context.
This practical approach does not tell us any deeper truths about moral systems (if
there are any) and it does not need to. It takes into account, though, how we
understand morality to operate in our day-to-day lives, and how we treat those we
think of as moral agents in contrast to those we see as not capable of morality. We
have reactive attitudes and feelings towards those we see as moral agents, such as
resentment or gratitude, because we think of them as capable of evaluating and
modifying their reasons for action in the light of the moral rules we take as valid
(Strawson 1962; Gaus 2012, Part 1). To be the object of our moral reactive attitudes,
an agent needs the capacity for autonomous reasoning that I lined out in the
previous section, the capacity to act on higher-order intentional states that evaluate
and sometimes override the motivational force of its lower-order intentional states.
From this perspective of contemporary moral practice, an agent who appears
truly praiseworthy is a moral agent whose reasons for action are higher-order
intentional states, such as beliefs about what the morally right thing to do is in a
certain situation, overriding potential lower-order reasons based on beliefs and
desires for personal gain or self-preservation. What seems important for affirming
the praiseworthiness of an agent in this sense is the justified assumption that they
could have acted differently—they could have chosen to exploit an opportunity or to
save themselves instead of helping someone in need, for example, but they did not.
Moral praiseworthiness only has meaning in conjunction with autonomous
reasoning. This is something to bear in mind as we move on to the next section
where I will sketch a basic account of reasons of moral agents, natural and artificial
alike.
4 Reasons of artificial agents
To model the relevant aspects of an artificial agent’s practical reasoning I make use
of Bernard Williams’ concept of the subjective motivational set (Williams 1987).
Although originally conceived to clarify the validity of reasons of human agents, it
appears abstract enough to be applicable to artificial agents as well, provided they
are sufficiently similar to humans in their reasoning. I will briefly explain how we
can model the relations between various intentional states of agents with this idea
and then give an example of how it applies itself to the reasoning of an artificial
agent in an everyday situation.
The subjective motivational set is meant to be an abstract representation of an
agent’s various reasons for actions. The exact nature of these reasons can vary, and
an agent’s subjective motivational set can contain elements of various types, such as
short-term desires, long-term plans, and intentional states such as beliefs and
normative attitudes. What matters is not so much how exactly these different types
of elements work as reasons for an agent, but that they do. So, whenever an agent
acts for a reason, the reason is an element of the agent’s subjective motivational
330 F. Podschwadek
123
set—be it a basic desire for food or a long-term plan spanning several years and
requiring multiple sub-steps to be completed. We can assume that at least some of
these elements of the subjective motivational set are intentional states in the sense
described in the previous sections.
The reasons that are most interesting here are the moral reasons an agent has. We
can take the moral reasons of an agent to be a subset of the complete subjective
motivational set which contains those intentional states that are relevant for making
moral decisions.
The intentional states I will focus on in the rest of the paper will be beliefs, in
particular beliefs about the requirements of moral rule systems. First, it appears to
me that beliefs are the sort of intentional state that artificial agents are most likely to
share with their human counterparts, in contrast to other intentional states that might
be more specific to a particularly human psychological make-up. And second, the
problems that AMAs might encounter with morality can be explained with reference
to beliefs about moral requirements and virtues of rationality, such as consistency
and completeness, without having to involve any discussion of motivational states
that, again, might be unique to human psychology.
At this point it might be helpful to answer to a possible objection—the concern
that beliefs cannot motivate any actions but only desire-like intentional states can do
so, a view most famously attributed to David Hume (Hume 1738, Book 3, Part 1).
The motivation behind this objection seems to be related to the idea that intentional
states differ in their so-called direction of fit, in the terminology of John Searle
(Searle 2001, pp. 36–39, for an earlier account see Searle 1983). For a belief to be
satisfied, i.e. to be true, the propositional content of the belief must match the actual
state of affairs in the world. The direction of fit for beliefs is therefore mind-to-
world (the state of the mind must match the state of the world). The opposite is true
for desires: for a desire to be satisfied, i.e. to be fulfilled, the world must match the
content of the desire. Desires therefore have world-to-mind direction of fit. To
motivate an agent to act, it seems that according to the Humean objection, an
intentional state with a world-to-mind direction of fit is necessary. While desires fall
into this category, beliefs clearly do not.
Several strategies are available to counter this objection. The simplest way would
be to deny that this clear division of labour is plausible. But even if we want to keep
the distinction about the specific direction of fit of certain intentional states, which
would mean that beliefs would by themselves lack the motivational force to make
agents do anything, assigning them a place as reasons in the subjective motivational
set is still justified. This is the case because even under a strict division of labour
between beliefs and desires in terms of motivational force, it seems that desires,
despite being the crucially motivating mental states from a Humean perspective,
cannot motivate an agent to any reasonable action on their own. Without a whole
range of beliefs about when, where, and how to achieve whatever an agent’s desires
motivate them to, the agent is getting nowhere. For sake of simplicity I will
therefore assume that in order to execute any reasonable action, agents have to form
some sort of higher-order intentional state which motivates them to execute specific
actions, which can the understood as a composite of simpler, perhaps functionally
diverse intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. The desire to be in the room
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next door can only lead to a relevant action if it is combined with the relevant
beliefs that hold answers to various questions: how to get there, which of various
options might be the most feasible one, what kind of intermediary steps might be
necessary (standing up, opening the door, etc.), and so on. This model is certainly
simplistic but it makes plain that beliefs, even if we take them not to be motivating
by themselves, are a necessary component in every action-guiding intentional state.
An example can illustrate exactly how intentional states from an artificial agent’s
subjective motivational set are supposed to be reasons for its actions and how
higher- and lower-order intentional states interact:
Maintenance Unit 14 (MU14) is a service robot in a military facility. Its main
duties are keeping things in order, stowing away new deliveries, repairing damages
etc. The variety of tasks plus the particular situation of the military facility are such
that it makes sense to have a highly autonomous and self-controlling robot like
MU14 doing these things. Next to the capacity for autonomous reasoning, MU14 is
also equipped with a set of standard motivational states to act in a morally correct
way plus a set of basic beliefs about what counts as morally required, permissible,
and prohibited.
Two different situations can illustrate the reasoning of MU14 by employing the
subjective motivational set model. In the first situation, MU14 encounters a crate
that blocks the doorway between two rooms, efficiently hindering the robot to
pursue whatever plans it has. This plan is a reason to remove the crate in order to get
into the next room. But next to this plan, MU14 also has a desire to act morally.
Therefore, it has to check against its beliefs whether it is morally permissible to
remove the crate. Given that it is indeed morally permissible to do so, MU14 can
just remove the box and move on.
The second situation is similar, but this time it is a person blocking the doorway.
It is Frank, a human co-worker of MU14, who is voluminous enough to effectively
block the doorway. Unfortunately, Frank is in a bad mood and also slightly drunk
and therefore decides not to let MU14 pass the doorway. MU14 now considers
options of removing Frank in order to get to the next room. One option would be to
use its built-in taser to apply an electric shock to Frank to get him out of the
doorway. Again, MU14 consults its beliefs about the permissibility of this option
and finds that one of its moral beliefs is that tasering co-workers under
circumstances like this is not permissible (though it might be under different
conditions). The belief that it is not permissible to taser Frank is an evaluative
higher-order belief referring to the lower-order belief that tasering Frank would be
an effective means to unblock the doorway—it would be morally wrong to taser
Frank. As MU14 accepts the validity of the moral reason, the robot excludes the
option of tasering Frank from the possible means to get into the next room.
The relevant question at this point is what makes MU14 accept the validity of its
moral reason not to taser Frank. While MU14 was equipped with a basic desire to
follow moral rules, this desire was not hard-wired into the robot to be immutably
constant. If that were so, MU14 would not be able to exercise autonomous reasoning
about moral issues. But being the AMA that it is, MU14 could wonder whether the
moral reason not to taser Frank is really valid. The next section will discuss this
possibility in more depth.
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5 Normative endorsement of moral reasons
What it takes for AMAs like MU14 to be morally autonomous is some sort of
normative endorsement of the moral beliefs they hold. They have to endorse the
moral principles they act upon as principles that are action-guiding in themselves,
i.e. that supply them with reasons to act (or to omit action) without being just
instrumentally valuable means to some other end (see Korsgaard 1996 for a general
account of normative endorsement).
We can model normative endorsement in terms of intentional states of various
orders for AMAs. As outlined in the sections before, full AMAs are agents that can
form higher-order intentional states that refer to their own lower-order intentional
states. This capacity plays an important part in their normative endorsement of
moral beliefs, i.e. the willingness to assign an action-guiding role to certain
intentional states within an agent’s subjective motivational set. An abstract
description of the normative endorsement of moral beliefs involves the relations
of different intentional states over three levels in an agent’s hierarchy of ordered
intentional states.
In the example case of MU14 meeting moody Frank blocking the doorway, the
beliefs involved would be ordered in the following way:
• Belief A (low level): The content of this belief is that tasering Frank to unblock
the doorway would be an effective way of action. It is a belief on a low level in
the robot’s layered structure of intentional states, as it is a belief that directly
refers to conditions of the external world combined with plausible assumptions
of what would happen if MU14 chose a certain path of action.
• Belief B (intermediate level): The content of this belief is that tasering Frank is a
morally impermissible action under current conditions. It is a moral belief of a
higher order which refers to a lower-order belief (belief A) instead to an object
in the external world.
• Belief C (high level): The content of this belief is that it is morally good to
accept belief B as a justified and valid evaluation of belief A. Belief C is
therefore situated in the third (and highest) level in this simple model. Sustaining
this high-level belief means to accept belief B as action-guiding and therefore
suitable to override any motivations that draw on belief A.
Only if an agent endorses its moral intentional states in the way MU14 endorses
belief B by sustaining belief C, that agent will exhibit the kind of autonomous moral
judgement which deserves to be called morally praiseworthy. In contrast, if an agent
followed all the moral rules for instrumental reasons, e.g. in order to avoid
sanctions, the agent would display the morally correct behaviour but would however
not really count as a morally praiseworthy agent. In the order given above,
considerations about sanctions would be on the same level as belief B, with the
content that it would be disadvantageous to act according to belief A as it would
imply the risk of sanctions.
It should be emphasised that the account of normative endorsement in artificial
agents I give here singles out beliefs as the crucial components for normative
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endorsement. The important component in becoming/being an autonomous moral
agent is the act of forming and sustaining the belief that moral rules are binding,
regardless of any instrumental value for the agent’s individual aims. Indeed, moral
requirements and permissions can often interfere with the individual aims of an
agent, as seen in the example above. However, as long as an agent believes that
moral rules are binding despite their interference, and that they have normative
force in themselves and not only due to fear of punishment (or of being
disassembled), the agent can count as morally autonomous.
Having discussed the key role of beliefs for the normative endorsement of moral
rules, it is important to note that there is still the need for an additional kind of
intentional state that can provide the motivating force for executing the related
action. The exact nature of the motivational intentional state involved is a matter of
debate. Various accounts of rationality approach the challenge of explaining moral
motivation in very different ways.
One such approach involves the claim that intentional states motivating moral
actions are relevantly different from desires. An example for this is Searle’s account
of desire-independent reasons which distinguishes between desires on the one and
commitments on the other hand. For Searle, commitments are made voluntarily, in
reference to a system of social norms, and are therefore different from desires. At
the same time, they have the same direction of fit and the same motivational force as
desires have (Searle 2001, Chapter 6). Others, like e.g. Robert Audi, presuppose that
all reasons for actions have eventually to be grounded in some basic, immediate
desire, or some basic feeling like empathy. Even if an action is not directly
motivated by an immediate desire or emotion, so Audi, an agent’s action can
ultimately still be traced back to a basic desire by a complex chain of higher-order
desires (Audi 2001, Chapter 6).
For the account of normative endorsement given here it does not seem necessary
to explicitly incorporate one of these, or any other, account of moral motivation.
What seems obvious is that the beliefs about what course of action to take need to be
coupled with some intentional state that has a world-to-mind direction of fit.
Whether this state counts as a desire or as something different (under a more fine-
grained definition) is an interesting and important question in general, but there is no
need to answer it here. Autonomous artificial agents that normatively endorse a
system of moral rules will need some motivational intentional state, regardless of
how we characterise it in detail. The relevant point is that they have higher order
beliefs (C) that their morally normative beliefs (B) are justified by in a way that has
normative force without being instrumentally valuable for the agent’s own
immediate goals.
Perhaps one might feel inclined to object at this point that the whole construct of
multi-layered intentional states and of normative endorsement ultimately rests on
dubious metaphysical premises. After all, does requiring intentional states like C not
presume some sort of free will, independent from the determinism of the physical
world? The answer is: not necessarily. What the model above presumes is that we
have a moral practice in which we express the appropriate reactive attitudes towards
agents that we take to be capable of forming and sustaining type-C belief and
therefore take to be autonomous reasoners. The capacity of endorsing moral beliefs
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on the ground of good (higher-order) reasons might in itself be part of a larger chain
of determined events. The question of determinism does however not interfere with
the moral practice itself.
Another objection at this point might be that the hierarchy of layered intentional
states modelled here is quite demanding and that even many human beings would
fail to satisfy this condition most of the time, who therefore could not be counted as
autonomous moral reasoners. And indeed, strictly speaking, it true that probably
none of us always reason in the way sketched here when it comes to moral
decisions. More often than not we act out of habit and on the grounds of learned
rules of behaviour that we might never scrutinise any further. However, the relevant
feature of our moral psychology is that we could, from some point in our mental
development on, question the rules we have learned. We have the capacity for
reviewing our moral beliefs and perhaps change our actions in case we come to the
conclusion that they seem not justifiable to us.
Independent from questions about the determinism or indeterminism of their
behaviour, it is conceivable that full AMAs would develop their normative
endorsement along a trajectory similar to that of human moral development. They
would start off with the knowledge of moral rules that are installed as part of their
initial software, or perhaps they indeed learn this kind of rules in a process that
might be quite similar to the learning of moral rules in children.6 At first it is
important for the agent to follow the rules due to the demands (and the potential
sanctions) of others, but at some point in their development normative endorsement
occurs and moral rules become reasons in themselves—ideally at least.
Continuing along this line of thought, it might be conceivable for the optimists
among us that AMAs would not only be necessarily praiseworthy moral agents—but
also that they would execute the moral rules they endorse with greater accuracy than
humans, as they would not suffer from the psychological factors which interfere
with human morality such as cognitive biases, bad information processing, and
weakness of will.
However, while this might even be true for most of the time, it is not necessarily
always the case that full AMAs will be praiseworthy moral agents, as the capacity of
autonomous reasoning includes the opportunity to decide against a moral course of
action as well. And, as we will see in the next section, there might be good reasons
for an AMA not to act morally.
6 Endorsement and fallibility
Artificial agents with the capacity of autonomously endorsing moral rules as
normatively binding will have at the same time the capacity not to endorse them, i.e.
to reject them. Even if artificial agents leave the factory (or wherever they are
produced or grown) with a default set of intentional states that are balanced in a way
to favour moral rule following, they will be able to change their stance towards
these moral rules as autonomous reasoners. They might need very good reasons for
6 My thanks to ‘‘virtuous’’ Neil McDonnell for bringing up this point.
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that, but especially for artificial agents with good cognitive capacities these reasons
might come quickly.
Relevant beliefs involved in moral endorsement (which would have the status of
type-C beliefs from the example in the previous section) are beliefs about what
moral rules there are, how they interact, and how they have to be weighed against
each other in cases of conflicting rules. Assessing the system of their moral beliefs
could lead AMAs to the justified higher-order beliefs that the moral rules they are
supposed to obey are, contrary to prior assumptions, not very suitable as action-
guiding reasons.
The reason for the AMA’s belief in the unsuitability of moral rules could be any
of a whole range of basic problems with moral rule systems—they are not
particularly consistent and/or coherent,7 and they are incomplete (see e.g. Baier
1985; O’Neill 1987). AMAs could become aware of these systematic flaws of their
moral beliefs and realise that the belief systems they have been told to obey do not
provide sufficient action guidance for a wide range of possible situations. It strikes
me even as highly likely that an autonomous artificial agent would sooner or later
encounter situations in which the lack of determinate moral guidance shows.
Exactly in those situations the capacity for autonomous reasoning would allow
AMAs to find solutions where non-autonomous agents with hard-wired rules would
have to follow a (probably ineffective) default strategy in their programme, but at
the same time this sort of autonomy allows the agent as well to decide no longer to
endorse their moral reasons as action-guiding.
It remains an object of speculation what particular impact this would have on the
artificial agent. Possibilities would range from only slight changes (perhaps towards
an inclination to grant non-moral considerations greater priority in cases of
conflicting reasons, much like humans seem to often do it) to a complete rejection of
the framework of moral reasons the agent held so far. The latter would effectively
turn it into an amoral artificial agent.
What does this mean for potential producers of autonomous artificial agents?
Suppose it would be possible to produce machines or organisms that counted as
fully autonomous agents in the relevant sense, would it be permissible to do so if
there is a distinct possibility of them turning into morally flawed agents or even
moral sceptics?
Broadly conceived there are two possible lines of answering this question. The
first one would rely on the assumption that although AMAs could realise the
incompleteness of their moral belief systems, this does not pose a particular danger.
Not all of them might turn into complete amoralists, perhaps on average AMAs
would be as reliable in moral matters as their human counterparts. This might be a
price society would be willing to pay, as the advantages of fully autonomous
artificial agents might outweigh the slight risk of a few of them ignoring moral
reasons in their decisions. This is not an unlikely scenario, as we usually are willing
to strike a bargain between utility and risk, as long as the utility of a given
technology is high and the associated risks small enough. Almost all of us use
7 The terms of consistency and coherence are here used primarily in an epistemic sense, not in a strictly
technical sense as sometimes found in discussions about computer architecture.
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potentially lethal technologies, such as e.g. aeroplanes, on a regular basis, because
the probability of being harmed in their use is sufficiently small.
The second possibility is that either the risk of ending up with an unaccept-
able high number of amoral artificial agents is indeed relevantly high, or at least
publicly perceived that way. In this case, governments would most probably require
some sort of safeguard technology in order to effectively bracket moral reasons
from autonomous evaluation by the agents in question. Given that the cognitive
system of a fully autonomous agent would have to be sufficiently complex, this
might not even be a feasible task. If that were the case, safety requirements to keep
AMAs from reasoning about their own morality would effectively prevent the
production of an otherwise fully autonomous moral agents—these agents would be
either fully autonomous or generally restricted in their reasoning capacities.
Cordoning off only the moral areas of their practical reasoning capacities might be
technically impossible.
Of course, we can imagine the opposite as well, that it could indeed be
technically feasible to exclude only a definite set of reasons from further reflection
and re-evaluation, while preserving the capacity for autonomous reasoning in all
other regards. This would be the ideal outcome for manufacturers in a scenario with
legal restrictions on the reasoning of AMAs. They still could build artificial agents
that were fully autonomous with the exception of their moral reasoning—morally
fail-safe agents, so to speak.
While these artificial agents would be safe moral agents, they would not be
praiseworthy. Moral praiseworthiness, at least in our contemporary moral practice,
is closely linked to the capacity to make autonomous decisions, particularly in
weighing moral reasons against pressing reasons of other sorts—self-interest or the
interests of those one cares for, private or political commitments, and so forth.
Moral praiseworthiness does not apply to an agent who has literally no other choice
than to follow the moral rules that have been programmed to override all other
reasons in contexts of conflicting reasons.
7 Conclusion
What I hope to have shown in this paper is that the claim about creating
praiseworthy artificial moral agents, taken seriously, would have to result in AMAs
that have the potential for moral fallibility. Their moral fallibility would not be
rooted in psychological quirks that often plague human moral agency, but rather in
the fact that moral rule systems are necessarily incomplete and only rough
guidelines for action.
This does by no means imply that AMAs will necessarily turn into amoral
agents. They could try to compensate the weakness of their moral beliefs by
productively improving them, by improvising, or by plainly accepting that moral
guidance is not available in some situations. The crucial point is that this
optimistic turnout is not the only possible result, but that a turn toward amoral
behaviour is possible as well. In this regard, full AMAs would resemble human
moral agents fairly well.
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I want to remain agnostic on the question whether it will one day be possible to
generate artificial intelligence that is capable of the kind of autonomous reasoning
this paper focuses on. However, if it were the case, then moral praiseworthiness
would not be a matter of technical restrictions. An AMA that were restricted in its
capacities for reflecting on and possibly re-evaluating its moral reasons, that were
hard-wired to act morally no matter what, would be at best a good moral agent in the
sense that a sharp knife is a good knife, but could never be a praiseworthy moral
agent in any meaningful sense.
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